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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
Subsequent to transfer from the Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(4), the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Dr. Barbuto owed no legal
duty to Nicholas Sorensen under the. facts alleged in the complaint? "The question
of whether a duty exists is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness.55 Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostich. 1999 UT 20 at If 9, 979 P.2d 317, 320 (quotations and citations
omitted). This issue was addressed in Dr. Barbuto's memorandum in support of his
motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29.)
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that Sorensens5 complaint failed to
state a claim for breach of contract? A trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
reviewed for correctness as a question of law. Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App
36,11 9, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 (quotations and citation omitted).
3. Did the trial court correctly determine that Sorensens5 complaint failed to
state a claim for intentional or negligent tort? A trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
is reviewed for correctness as a question of law. Id.

1

PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following is determinative, at least in part, of the issues
presented on appeal:
No privilege exists under this rule:
Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that
condition is an element of any claim or defense . . . in any
proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as a
claim or defense;
Rule 506(d)(1), Utah R.Evid.
No liability shall be imposed on any health care provider on the
basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance of result to be obtained from any health care rendered
unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set forth
in writing and signed by the health care provider or an
authorized agent of the provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6.
"Malpractice action against a health care provider35 means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort,
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care
provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(16).
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable
2

him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which
the patient places his medical condition at issue as an element or
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a
physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that
patient for the medical condition at issue may provide
information, interviews, reports, records, statements,
memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-28-8(4).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
In their complaint, the plaintiffs/appellants (collectively the "Sorensens55)

allege breach of contract and various tort causes of action based upon the
participation of neurologist John P. Barbuto, M.D. ("Dr. Barbuto55) with defense
counsel in a separate personal injury action instituted by Nicholas Sorensen
('"Nicholas55), who Dr. Barbuto had treated but was not treating at the time of any
events related to Sorensens5 current claims. Sorensens base their claims on alleged
breach of confidentiality and allegedly false or incorrect information provided by Dr.
Barbuto to the lawyer defending Nicholas Sorensen5s personal injury action.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Dr. Barbuto moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R.Civ.P.

After written and oral arguments, the trial court ruled in Dr. Barbuto5s favor,
dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Sorensens appealed that decision to the
3

Utah Supreme Court which, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), transferred
the appeal to this Court.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nicholas was injured in an automobile accident on July 24, 1999. (R. 2 11 5.)

For approximately the next one and one-half years, Dr. Barbuto provided
neurological medical care to Nicholas (R. 2 1f 6), after which Dr. Barbuto ceased
being a listed provider under Sorensens5 insurance plan and Michael Goldstein, M.D.
began to treat Nicholas. (Id.)
Nicholas subsequently commenced a personal action seeking to recover
damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. (R. 2 11 7.) Nicholas prevailed
in the personal injury action, and was awarded a substantial monetary judgment.
(Id.) During the personal injury litigation, Nicholas made his medical records,
including those in the possession of Dr. Barbuto, part of the evidence.
In May 2003, defense counsel in the personal injury case subpoenaed Dr.
Barbuto to testify at trial, which was scheduled to begin later that month. (R. 3
11 8.) The trial was postponed until October 2003, and in the interim Dr. Barbuto
had ex parte communications with defense counsel. (R. 3 UU 8-9.) Subsequendy,
Dr. Barbuto was retained by defense counsel as an expert to review medical records
of treatment provided to Nicholas after Dr. Barbuto had ceased his treatment and to
opine on the cause of some of Nicholas's symptoms.
4

Ultimately, Nicholas objected to his testimony and had Dr. Barbuto excluded
from testifying as an expert at trial. (R. 4 U 11.) After successful resolution of
Nicholas's personal injury action, Sorensens commenced the legal action which is the
subject of this appeal. In addition to Dr. Barbuto's actions, Sorensens set forth
inflammatory allegations attempting to impune Dr. Barbuto personally and assign to
him improper motives reflecting displeasure of the plaintiffs3 personal injury bar with
Dr. Barbuto generally. (R. 4 UH 12-13.) This personal attack on Dr. Barbuto was
diatribe was proliferated in the argument of Sorensens5 counsel before the trial court.
(R. 41-42, Iff 8-9; T. 18-20.)1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On a motion to dismiss, the trial court and an appellate court must look to the
face of the complaint to determine its factual and legal sufficiency. The ultimate
question is whether the facts alleged support a claim for relief under any legally
cognizable right of action. Sorensens3 complaint falls below this standard.

*Despite its obvious irrelevance to the legal claims of their complaint,
Sorensens5 continue to gratuitously advance this tirade before this Court. (Aplt's
Brf. p. 6.) Counsel for Sorensens should know that these defamatory allegations are
both irrelevant to the purely legal questions before this Court and that Dr. Barbuto
is defenseless to defend himself and his motives in the context of arguing purely
questions of law relating to the duty issue. This unnecessary personal and
professional attack on Dr. Barbuto is contrary to admonition and spirit of the Utah
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. (See, e.g. Standards 1 and 3.)
5

All duties owed by a physician to a patient arise solely from a physicianpatient relationship. When that relationship ends, so do most of the duties owed to
the patient. While the duty of confidentiality survives termination of the
relationship, it is not an absolute one. Whenever a patient places his condition at
issue in litigation, the physician, even one who has an ongoing physician-patient
relationship, is free to release medical records material to the litigation and to
participate in ex parte interviews with defense counsel. There is nothing in the law
which would place a physician on notice that by engaging in activities expressly
permitted by law, he could be exposed to a breach of contract or tort claim.
Sorensens5 complaint fails to establish that Dr. Barbuto breached any contract
or tort duties. Not only is there no legal duty subject to breach, Sorensens fail to
allege a legally recognized injury. To the contrary, the complaint establishes that
Nicholas suffered no legal injury because of Dr. Barbuto's actions.
Sorensens admit they are attempting to create new law. Even so, they would
have this Court create a new duty and apply it ex post facto to Dr. Barbuto. In the
process, they would have the Court discount the important role played by witnesses
in general, and expert witnesses in particular, in the litigation process and deprive
Dr. Barbuto of the protections traditionally afforded to one engaged in the judicial
process.

6

ARGUMENT
Sorensens and their counsel have gone out of their way to allege irrelevant,
inaccurate and insulting "facts53 relating to Dr. Barbuto's alleged involvement with
"defense attorneys.55 Such allegations are alleged in the Complaint (1HI 12-13, R. 45.), argued to the trial court (T. 8:15 through 10:5), and the set out in their brief to
this Court (Aplt5s Brf. pp. 5-7). None of these allegations have anything to do with
the legal sufficiency of the complaint.1 The issue before the trial court and this Court
has nothing to do with whether Dr. Barbuto has performed independent medical
exams for defendants in personal injury cases or what his motives are in doing so.
The only issue is whether Dr. Barbuto did anything which would breach a legal duty
owed to Nicholas and/or caused him injury.
I.

WHETHER A COMPLAINT IS PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER
RULE 12(b)(6) DEPENDS UPON WHETHER, ON ITS FACE, THE
COMPLAINT CONTAINS FACTS WHICH STATE A LEGALLY
COGNIZABLE CLAIM.
The only issue before the trial court and this Court is the legal sufficiency of

Sorensens5 complaint, i.e., whether the alleged facts state a claim for relief which is
recognized by law. It is the legal sufficiency of the complaint which is challenged by
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, the court
must "first examine the applicable law.53 Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.,
910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). If the facts fail to state a valid claim which is

7

recognized under Utah law, it must be dismissed because there is no legal basis upon
which to grant relief. In oral argument before the District court, Sorensens5 counsel
acknowledged that he was attempting to make new law, essentially conceding that
his stated claims were not cognizable as a matter of law. (T. 17-18.)
It is significant in evaluating the trial court's analysis of Sorensens5 complaint
that they did not argue before the trial court the sufficiency of their complaint, as
much as advancing new factual assertions which appear nowhere in the complaint.
(R. 33-63.) It is axiomatic that the sufficiency of the complaint is based upon the
factual allegations of the complaint in the context of applicable law. One cannot
improve a legally insufficient complaint by adding conclusory factual allegations in a
memorandum opposing a motion to dismiss. It merits notice that, despite
evaluating those additional facts, the trial court found no legal claim for relief was
alleged.
In addition to legal weaknesses discussed below, Sorensens5 complaint suffered
several factual deficiencies. They repeatedly argued to the trial court that it must
accept all of their factual allegations as true. That is correct, however, only as to
well-pled facts. "[A] court may grant relief only if a valid legal basis supported by
well-pled facts is asserted in the complaint.55 Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA. 952
P.2d 1071,1076 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). Conclusory allegations do not
constitute well-pled facts. "Mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported
.

8

by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal.55
Kuhre v. Goodfellow. 2003 UT App 85,1f 21, 69 P.3d 286, 291 (citation omitted).
The trial court correcdy determined that the alleged facts, as opposed to
conclusory allegations of Sorensens5 complaint, failed to state legally cognizable
claims for relief.

II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
SORENSENS WERE UNABLE TO STATE A BREACH OF
CONTRACT CLAIM.
Sorensens5 claims fail because there is no written contract, no breach of
contract and no damage.
A.

THERE IS NO LEGAL CONTRACT BETWEEN DR. BARBUTO
AND NICHOLAS.
Sorensens claim that Dr. Barbuto breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing arising from an implied contract between Nicholas and Dr. Barbuto. There
are multiple problems with this claim.
Stripped to its legal essentials, Sorensens claim against Dr. Barbuto is that he
breached a duty of physician-patient confidentiality by providing expert opinions on
the cause of Nicholas's medical symptoms to counsel defending against his personal
injury claim. In short, Sorensens claim that Dr. Barbuto breached a "guarantee55 to
his patient that he would not reveal confidential information without permission.

9

Alternatively, the allegation is that Dr. Barbuto Warranted" that such confidential
information would not be disclosed.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") subsumes contract claims.
Moreover, the Act provides that no liability based upon a contract can be enforced
unless it is in writing.
No liability shall be imposed on any health care provider on the
basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance of result to be obtained from any health care rendered
unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set forth
in writing and signed by the health care provider or an
authorized agent of the provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Act establishes the legislature's intent that contract claims
against a health care provider not be the basis of independent causes of action.
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort,
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care
provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(16).
Under the rules of statutory construction, courts look to the plain language of
the statute, viewed in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. £.^.,
State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56,1125, 4 P.3d 795, 796. Courts defer to the legislature's
choice of language, City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 958
10

(Utah 1996) and "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly, [giving
effect] to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning.35 Parks v. Utah
Transit Authority. 2002 UT 55,11 22, 53 P.3d 473, 478. Similarly, omissions of
terms should be taken notice of and given effect. State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27,
1121, 64 P.3d 1218,1222. The overriding rule of statutory construction is to give
effect to legislative intent. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1f 34, 52 P.3d 1210,1221.
[I]f we find a provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its
application, we must analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize
its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose.
Id.
The clear legislative intent in enacting the Healthcare Malpractice Act is to
preclude separate contract claims which arise from the physician-patient relationship
and to incorporate all such claims within malpractice claims based upon the legal
standards for those claims. To the extent a contract claim arises from the duties
imposed by the physician-patient relationship, including the duty of confidentiality,
it is precluded unless there is a written contract. Even if a claim based upon an oral
contract were permitted to stand, that claim would be subsumed within the
standards of a medical malpractice claim.

11

B.

SORENSENS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ALLEGE BREACH
OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTY.
Assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that Dr. Barbuto had a duty

under an implied contract, Sorensens failed to allege facts which would support a
claim for breach of an implied contract. The complaint alleges only: (1) breach of
confidentiality2; and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both
claims presuppose the existence of a contract. An "implied53 contract must still meet
the fundamental elements of any contract. c To prevail on a claim of breach of
implied contract, [a plaintiff] must prove the existence of an implied contract,
created by mutual assent, and [the defendant's] failure to comply with its terms.
Peterson v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 2002 UT App 56,11 10, 42 P.3d 1253, 1256
(emphasis added). 3 There is nothing in the complaint which supports an allegation
that Dr. Barbuto agreed not to discuss Nicholas's medical treatment with defense
attorneys in the context of a personal injury action where he is statutorily privileged
to do so.
Moreover, it is well established that any contract contains by implication the
law which exists at the time of contracting. E.g., Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v.
2

The confidentiality issue is discussed below with relation to the tort claims.

3

Though the issue of existence of an implied contract presents fact issues, a
"court retains the power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury
could find that a [Jcontract exists." Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 100,
U 6, 46 P.3d 247, 250 (brackets in original, citations omitted).
12

Industrial Commission. 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978). Two such pieces of law,
discussed in detail below, are incorporated into any contract which might exist here.
Rule 506, Utah R.Civ.P. provides that no privilege exists where a patient places his
physical condition at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4) permits disclosure by a
treating physician of medical information and interviews with others regarding a
patient's condition. As a matter of law, Dr. Barbuto could not breach a contract by
doing what he is legally permitted to do.
Nor does the complaint state a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. First, a claim for violation of this implied covenant arises only from
a legal contract between the parties. E.g., Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004
UT 28,1f 14, 94 P.3d 193, 196. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
implicitly tied to and limited by the agreement between the parties
As a general rule, every contract is subject to an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, under which both parties to a
contract promise not to intentionally or purposely do anything
which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the
fruits of a contract. However, we also have stated that we will
not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to make a better contract for the parties than they made for
themselves. Nor will we construe the covenant to establish new,
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties.
Malibu Investment Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30,11 19, 996 P.2d 1043, 1048
(punctuation, citations omitted, emphasis added). A party's contractual obligations
cannot "be enlarged and expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith
13

and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually
made." Tensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City. 951 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah
1997). cc[T]he degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of
the covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined their
expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion through express
contract terms.35 Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.. 2003 UT 57,11 20, 84
P.3d 1154, 1159 (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court expanded the list of
limits on the scope of the implied covenant in Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons,
Inc., 2004 UT 101,104 P.3d 1226, stating that ccwe will not use this covenant to
achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's sense of justice but inconsistent
with the express terms of the applicable contract."
Even if there were an implied contract between the parties, Sorensens have
failed to allege facts which establish a breach of that contract.
C.

SORENSENS FAILED TO ALLEGE LEGALLY RECOGNIZED
DAMAGES IN A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION.
While Sorensens were not, under notice pleading standards, required to

establish an evidentiary basis for their damage claims, they did have the burden to
allege some facts to demonstrate that there were potential damages for which relief
could be granted. They failed to shoulder that burden.
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It is fundamental that one of the elements of a breach of contract claim is
damage flowing from the breach. E.g., Bair v. Axiom Design- L.L.C.: 2001 UT 20,
H 14, 20 P.3d 388, 391. There are two types of contract damages. Compensatory
damages "flow naturally" from the breach (Bhck v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66,1f
28,100 P.3d 1163, 1170) and seeks "to place the aggrieved party in the same
economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed.55
Mahmood v.Ross. 1999 UT 104, If 38, 990 P.2d 933, 941 (quoting from Calamari
& Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14-4, at 591 (3d ed. 1987)). Consequential
damages are those in addition to compensatory damages which are "reasonably
within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the
contract was made.55 Black H 28 at 1170.
There are no facts alleged on the face of the complaint which could support an
allegation that the alleged breach of contract caused Sorensens economic loss. Nor
are there any facts establishing that economic damages for breach of contract were
contemplated or foreseen by Mr. Sorensen or Dr. Barbuto. Simply stated, Sorensens
failed to adequately plead contract damages, which provides another justification for
dismissal of the contract claim. See Bennett v. Tones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonougL 2003 UT 9, U 43, 70 P.3d 17, 27 (affirming trial court's dismissal of
claim for failure to adequately plead damages.)
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HI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SORENSENS 5
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF
CONFEDENTIALITY.
There is no question that a treating physician owes a duty of confidentiality to

his patient. The question presented by Sorensens3 complaint is whether Dr.
Barbuto's actions give rise to a legal claim for breach of confidentiality. The
complaint establishes that Dr. Barbuto was Nicholas's treating neurologist from
approximately July of 1999 through approximately February of 2001. (R. 2,1111 56) After that, Nicholas was treated for his neurological symptoms by another
physician. (R. 2 11 6.) These facts lead to two conclusions. First, the only
confidences which Dr. Barbuto had a duty to preserve (those related to
communications and treatment during his treatment period) were already disclosed
by Nicholas as part of the personal injury action. Second, Dr. Barbuto was not
under a duty to preserve from disclosure the records he reviewed that post-dated his
period of treatment. Of course, the confidentiality of these records was also waived
as part of the evidence in the personal injury case.
The duties owed by a doctor arise from the physician-patient relationship.
E.g., Pegalis and Wachsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice (1980) § 2:3 at
45. See also Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1980) (recognizing
physician-patient relationship as source of duty owed to patient). The relationship
may be terminated in a number of ways, including dismissal of the physician by the
16

patient. Weiss v. Roianasathit 975 S.W.2d 113,119-20 (Mo. 1998) (en banc);
Lyons v. Grethen 239 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Va. 1977). "Where a physician under
appropriate circumstances ceases to attend a patient, his responsibility ordinarily
ceases without any formality.55 Clark v. Wichman. 179 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1962).
The duty of confidentiality extends beyond the termination of the physician-patient
relationship, but other duties owed by the physician come to an end.
Confidentiality of a patient's medical records is not absolute. See State v.
CardalL 1999 UT 51,1129, 982 P.2d 79, 85 (holding privilege under Rule 506,
Utah R.Evid. is not absolute). The complaint establishes-that Sorensens initiated
litigation based upon the physical injuries Dr. Barbuto and Dr. Goldstein treated.
(R. 2 11 7.) The complaint also establishes the records regarding the neurological
care for Nicholas were part of the evidence long before Dr. Barbuto's involvement in
the case. (R. 3 1f 8.)
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that no privilege exists
when physical condition is placed at issue in litigation.
No privilege exists under this rule:
. . . As to communication relevant to an issue of the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding
in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense . . .
Rule 506(d)(1), Utah Evid. Utah statute goes beyond this proclamation of no
privilege to expressly permit a treating physician to discuss the patient's records.
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A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable
him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which
the patient places his medical condition at issue as an element or
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a
physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that
patient for the medical condition at issue may provide
information, interviews, reports, records, statements,
memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4) (emphasis added).
We note that Rule 506 is intended to supersede § 78-24-8(4), at least with
respect to the first two sentences in the statute which establish the privilege. Accord
DeBryv. Goates. 2000 UT App 58,11 24 n. 2, 999 P.2d 582, cert, denied, 9 P.3d
170 (2000). However, the statute has never been repealed and the balance of the
statute contains a legislative determination that a treating physician is free to provide
information and interviews under specified circumstances and is consistent with the
provisions of Rule 506. In other words, the last sentence of the statute is a
statement of what a physician may or may not do when the privilege no longer exists
and is unaffected by Rule 506's statement of the scope of the privilege. Sorensens
argue that whether the statute "has been repealed is immaterial; the superseded
statute is of no effect.55 (Aplt5s Brf. p. 27 n. 4.) This argument ignores the
fundamental distinctions between the two portions of the statute.
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The Supreme Court discussed a similar issue in Ryan v. Gold Cross Services,
Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1995). In a challenge to a statute as an infringement
on judicial rule making authority, the Ryan court explained that while the Supreme
Court had authority under Article VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of Utah to
create rules of evidence, the legislature retains authority over non-procedural,
substantive issues. The scope of privilege is a rule of evidence over which the
Supreme Court has control, subject to legislative review. The issue of regulation of
physician activities, however, is a substantive one reserved to the legislature.
Sorensens cite no authority to establish that the Supreme Court's establishment of a
rule of evidence operates to repeal a legislative act dealing with substantive issues.
Indeed, Ryan rejects such an analysis.
Sorensens place much emphasis on Dr. Barbuto's ex parte discussions with
defense counsel. There is, however, no legal significance to the ex parte nature of
those discussions. The Utah State Bar, consistent with Rule 506 and § 78-24-8(4),
issued an ethical opinion prior to the events at issue here, stating that cc[n]o rule
prohibits any ex parte contact with plaintiffs treating physician when plaintiffs
physical condition is at issue.55 Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee
Opinion No. 99-03 (copy attached as Addendum A). 4 Accord^ Stempler v. Speidell,
4

Some attorneys vigorously opposed this conclusion before the ethics panel
and the bar commissioners, but were unable to establish any legal authority for
reaching a different conclusion.
19

495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985). There is no law that would place Dr. Barbuto or any
other physician on notice that engaging in ex parte discussions of a patient's physical
condition in the context of litigation would expose him to a tort claim.
Once a patient places his condition at issue in litigation, the physician-patient
privilege relating to that condition is waived. Legally, therefore, the patient can have
no reasonable expectation of confidentiality of the medical information. Rather than
parsing bits and pieces of cases dealing with general issues of, as Sorensens have
done, confidentiality, it is helpful to look at cases where courts have addressed the
exact issue before this Court.
A Louisiana appellate court addressed the issue in Glenn v. Kerlin. 248 So.2d
834 (La.App. 1971). In Glenn, the patient sued his physician for engaging in a
conference with defense counsel in a case where the patient's claims were based on
his physical condition. The court noted that cc[d]uring that conference, it is alleged,
Dr. Kerlin revealed plaintiffs3 physical condition and made available plaintiffs
medical records without any authorization by plaintiff and without being so ordered
by the court.35 Glenn at 834-35. The trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of
statutory language similar to § 78-24-8(4). The appellate court treated the issue
somewhat differently, viewing the claim as an invasion of privacy claim, but affirmed
on similar grounds. The Glenn court noted that a patient may not continue to claim
a right to privacy governing the physician where he commences litigation which puts
20

his physical condition at issue. Id. at 836. Viewing the facts of the complaint, the
Glenn court found that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against his
treating physician. Id.
In Moses v. Williams, 349 A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 1988), a case strikingly
similar to this one, the physician engaged in ex parte pretrial discussions with a
defendant's attorney and testified against the patient's economic interests at trial.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the legal action filed by the
patient against the physician, finding no duty. In Moses, the plaintiff claimed that
she first became aware of the physician's involvement when her attorney was advised
that the defense intended to call him as an expert witness at trial. Id. at 952. The
plaintiff in Moses made many of the same arguments advanced by Sorensens,
including application of AMA ethics guidelines and the Hippocratic Oath. She
argued that the physician "had a duty to refrain both from taking any actions which
would be adverse to her interests in the malpractice litigation and from making any
disclosures to other parties of information gained in the course of his treatment of
her, unless authorized to do so either by her or by law." Id.
The Moses court first addressed the breach of confidentiality issue, finding no
cause of action where the patient had placed her physical condition at issue.
We find that within the narrow factual context of this case,
appellant has failed to state a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality. To find otherwise would undermine several well21

established principles of this Commonwealth. We must keep in
mind that when Dr. Krane made his disclosures, appellant had
voluntarily instituted a medical malpractice action against Albert
Einstein and had thereby placed in issue her medical condition.
Given a patient's qualified right to privacy in his or her medical
records and an individual's reduced expectation of privacy as a
result of filing a civil suit for personal injuries in conjunction
with the policies supporting both the physician/patient privilege
statute and the absolute immunity from civil liability granted to
witnesses in judicial proceedings, we will not recognize the cause
of action for breach of confidentiality as pled in this case.
Moses at 953-54 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). In its analysis of the
plaintiffs arguments, the Moses court noted that cca patient's right to confidentiality
is less than absolute." Id. at 954. Accord Cardall supra. c The law is replete with
statutory justifications for disclosure that are deemed to outweigh the patient's right
to confidentiality." Moses at 954. The court discussed a Pennsylvania statute
substantively similar to § 78-24-8(4) and concluded that the legislation reflected a
balancing of the interests in confidentiality against the interests of justice. Id. at 955.
The Moses court also rejected all of the alternative duty theories advanced by
the patient.
[Cjontrary to appellant's assertions, ethical considerations and
the commonwealth's medical licensing statutes do not provide a
clear-cut source for recognizing a cause of action for breach
under the farts as alleged in this case. The Hippocratic Oath
does not serve as an absolute bar to disclosures . . . Similarly, the
1980 statement by the American Medical Association concerning
a doctor's release of information is broad, provides little
guidance, and does not in any event, prohibit Dr. Krane's actions
. . . Even the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the
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AMA do not absolutely bar disclosures of confidences. In fact,
Section 5.07 states that cc[a] physician should respect the patient's
expectations of confidentiality concerning medical records that
involve the patient5s care and treatment.53 As we have already
noted, an individual's expectations of confidentiality are
diminished when that individual files a civil action for personal
injuries. To allow recovery at law for conduct such as Dr.
Krane5s that occurred within the context of a judicial action
voluntarily instituted by appellant would ignore the fact that
appellant's privacy interest was diminished by her
commencement of the malpractice suit.
Moses at 956.
A patient in Missouri similarly sued his treating physician for breach of
confidentiality arising from ex parte discussions of his medical conditions with
defense counsel in an underlying personal injury action and his subsequent testimony
at trial that were contrary to the patient's economic interests. Brandt v. Medical
Defense Associates. 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).5 Brandt was careful to
distinguish between legal duty and ethical guidelines.
We believe a physician has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality not
to disclose any medical information received in connection with
his treatment of the patient. This duty arises out of a fiduciary
relationship that exists between the physician and the patient. If
such information is disclosed under circumstances where this
duty of confidentiality has not been waived, the patient has a
cause of action for damages in tort against the physician. In
addition to a physician's legal duty, a physician also has a separate
ethical duty to maintain the confidentiality of information

5

In Brandt, the trial court dismissed the complaint; the court of appeals
reversed; and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the dismissal.
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received from a patient. While the ethical principles may
evidence public policy that the courts may consider in framing
the specific limits of the legal duty of confidentiality, this legal
duty is to be distinguished from the ethical duty.
Brandt at 670-71 (emphasis added, citing the Hippocratic oath and the AMA
Principles of Medical Ethics). Having found a duty, the Brandt court noted that it
was not absolute.
Of course, the physician's testimonial privilege and the fiduciary
duty of confidentiality are not absolute; they must give way if
there is a stronger countervailing societal interest. One such
countervailing societal interest arises when a patient initiates
litigation concerning the patient's medical condition. Because
the patient will of necessity be required to waive the medical
privilege in presenting evidence at trial, it is common for courts
to find an implied waiver during the discovery stage of the
litigation. The question presented here is whether ex parte
discussions with the plaintiffs treating physicians are included
within this implied waiver.
Brandt at 671 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the ex parte discussions
fell within the litigation waiver.
The fiduciary duty that the physician owes the patient to
maintain in confidence medical information concerning the
patient's mental or physical condition does not apply to an ex
parte conference that is within the scope of the waivers.
Brandt at 674.
The Brandt plaintiff, as do Sorensens, argued that the physician owed a duty
not to engage in any activities adverse to the patient's economic interests.
Apparently, they would prohibit a physician from testifying truthfully if the truth
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was adverse to the patient recovering a monetary judgment. The court also rejected
that argument.
The plaintiffs contention here seems to be bottomed on the
assumption that a treating physician's duty to act with good faith
requires the physician to give testimony that is favorable and
beneficial to the patient and detrimental to the opponent. Such
an assumption is invalid; a trial is a search for the truth and the
primary obligation that the treating physician or any other
witness owes in a trial is to tell the truth. If, for instance, a
physician has determined that a patient made a full recovery and
this issue is relevant to the litigation, the treating physician may,
and in fact should, testify to this fact even though the patient
may be claiming to the contrary.
The situation is no different where the treating physician is asked
to testify as an expert. There is nothing embodied within the
relationship between a treating physician and the patient that
necessarily dictates either the style or the substance of the
testimony that the treating physician must give at trial, even as
an expert witness. It is not unusual for a party to elicit opinions
from an opponent's expert that support the cross-examiner's side
of the litigation. This is no less true in the case of the treating
physician than with any other witness.
Brandt at 673-74 (emphasis added).
Other courts have reached similar results. In Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 609
N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y.App. 1994), the court, though critical of the doctor's actions,
found no cause of action in a two-paragraph opinion.
While defendant physician's cavalier attitude in providing
admittedly careless and contradictory testimony, called
"negligent testimony", which he seeks to blame on the
representations allegedly made to him by counsel for both sides,
is hardly commendable, no action lies against him for breach of
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plaintiff patient's confidentiality, plaintiffs having waived
confidentiality by affirmatively placing the insured patient's
medical condition in issue in seeking to enjoin the reduction of
insurance benefits.
Aufrichtig at 214.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, in part, a motion to dismiss a breach
of confidentiality claim in Mull v. String. 448 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1984). Recognizing
that there was a cause of action for "unauthorized disclosure of information acquired
during the physician-patient relationship/ 3 the court found no cause of action for
breach of confidentiality, however, where the confidential information was
discoverable in underlying litigation.
[W]hen a patient sues a defendant other than his or her
physician, and the information acquired by the physician as a
result of the physician-patient relationship would be legally
discoverable by the defendant in that litigation, then the patient
will be deemed to have waived any right to proceed against the
physician for the physician's disclosure of this information to that
defendant or that defendant's attorney.
Mull at 954.
In Street v. Hedgepath. 607 A.2d 1238 (D.C.App. 1992), the court affirmed
a directed verdict, holding that ex parte interviews were not inappropriate and that
the claim of breach of confidentiality was barred by placing the patient's condition at
issue.
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The distinction between Sorensens5 authorities and arguments and these
carefully analyzed, published cases is that Sorensens5 arguments and authorities apply
to cases where the physician-patient relationship continued to exist or where the
patient's physical condition had not been placed at issue in litigation. The governing
law, in Utah and elsewhere, is that where a plaintiff places his physical condition at
issue in litigation, the expectation of confidentiality is waived and the physician is
free to disclose patient information which is material to the litigation. The trial
court correcdy found no duty owed by Dr. Barbuto to refrain from speaking about
the medical conditions already placed at issued by Nicholas or to avoid ex parte
discussions with counsel defending against Nicholas5s claims.
IV.

SORENSENS5 ASSERTION OF LEGAL DUTY ARISING FROM
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM.
Sorensens5 complaint ALLEGES that various "professional standards55 and

"statutes55 provided a legal basis for their claims against Dr. Barbuto. Sorensens
appear to have abandoned the claims of their complaint, the sufficiency of which is
the object of this appeal, in favor of attempts to create duties which they did not
plead in their complaint, such as those of a fiduciary. Dr. Barbuto does not dispute
that the physician-patient relationship creates a type of fiduciary duty to the patient.
However, the authorities cited by Sorensens deal with ongoing fiduciary duties and
are not in the context of the terminated physician-patient relationship. Here, the
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fiduciary relationship had come to an end. Admittedly, a limited duty of
confidentiality survived that termination, but Sorensens point to no authority that
any other duty continued once the relationship was over.
To give context to the trial court's ruling on Sorensens5 complaint, it is worth
quickly reviewing the allegations of duty in the complaint that are based upon
professional standards and statutes. Among the alleged statutory bases is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). HIPAA does not provide
for a private cause of action for breach of its provisions. O'Donnell v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Wyoming. 173 RSupp.2d 1176, 1179-80 (D.Wyo. 2001) (also
holding that "Congress did not intend to create an implied cause of action.") In fact,
cc

[n]o federal court reviewing the matter has ever found that Congress intended

HIPAA to create a private right of action." Swift v. Lake Park High School Dist.
108, 2003 WL 22388878 (N.D.I11. 2003). "Here . . . no private remedy exists.
That is the end of the issue. . ." Brock v. Provident America Ins. Co., 144
F.Supp.2d 652, 657 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 6

6

To avoid this legal death blow, Sorensens argued to the trial court that a
claim under HIPAA exists because no Utah courts "has expressly stated that no
private right of action can arise out of the statute." (R. 55.) In making that
argument, Sorensens fail to recognize that if these courts have not addressed the
issue, then the claim cannot, by definition, be legally recognized, especially in light
of no express statutory language creating such a right. Every federal court which has
addressed the issue has found that HIPAA creates no private remedy. The absence
of local authority to the contrary is persuasive of the lack of a legally recognized
cause of action, not the existence of one.
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Similarly, the Utah Medical Practice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-67-101 et
seq. does not create a private cause of action. That act is only a licensing and
regulatory statute which provides for disciplinary measures taken against a
physician5s licensee for violations of the act.

cc

In the absence of language expressly

granting a private right of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are
reluctant to imply a private right of action based on state law." Miller v. Weaver,
2003 UT 12, U 20, 66 P.3d 592, 598.
Sorensens relied heavily in their argument before the trial court on the AMA
Principles of Medical ethics and similar UMA provisions. No Utah case has held
that professional ethical principles are anything more than guidelines or that they
create a legal duty on the part of a professional. Courts examining that issue have
declined to find such a legal duty. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court refused
to impose a duty based upon the AMA5s ethical standards, concluding that to do so
would confuse ethical standards with legal standards of care. Stanley v. McCarver,
92 P.3d 849, 854 (Ariz. 2004). The Stanley court noted that "[w]hile rules of
professional conduct may provide evidence of how a professional would act, they do
not create a duty or establish a standard of care as a matter of law.55 Id. at 844 n. 6.
See also Moses supra, finding no duty respecting confidential information; Brandt,
supra, distinguishing between ethical duty imposed by AMA rules and legal duty
imposed by law.
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V.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT D O N O T SUPPORT
A CLAIM THAT DR. BARBUTO BREACHED "GENERAL DUTIES
OWED BY A PHYSICIAN TO A PATIENT.55
Sorensens argue that Dr. Barbuto "changed his diagnosis35 and breached his

duty to Nicholas by not informing him of the change. This characterization suffers
from two significant flaws. First, the new information received by Dr. Barbuto was
simply the records of subsequent treating physicians on which he formulated his
expert opinion. The difference between an expert opinion and a treating physician's
diagnosis is obvious, but significant. The expert opinion is reached in the sterile
review of medical records while reaching a diagnosis involves physical examination
of the patient along with observation of his symptoms. The cases cited by Sorensens
deal with the duty of a physician to inform the patient of facts material to the
treatment being currently provided. Arguably, if there is a change in information
which affects the patient's well-being with respect to conditions being treated, the
duty to inform might continue after termination of the relationship. However, the
information at issue here does not fall within that category. There was no new
information related to Dr. Barbuto's treatment of Nicholas, primarily because there
was no on-going treatment, but also because there was no information obtained by
Dr. Barbuto related to the treatment he provided or could provide. An analysis of
medical records, including those of subsequent treating physicians, does not result in
therapeutic information which Dr. Barbuto could then use or provide to Nicholas
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for purposes of medical treatment. There is simply nothing in the complaint which
indicates that Dr. Barbuto obtained any therapeutic information which would he
could provide to supplement the treatment being provided to Nicholas by other
physicians.
This brings us to the second problem with Sorensens5 argument. Sorensens
fail here, as elsewhere in their complaint, to recognize the significance of termination
of the physician-patient relationship. It is well-established law that the physician's
duty is based upon the relationship. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in
Clark, supra, the physician's duty to care for the patient ends with the termination of
the relationship. The allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the "new
information55 was obtained by Dr. Barbuto long after termination of the physicianpatient relationship.
VI.

SORENSENS 5 CLAIM FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Sorensens5 invasion of privacy claim fails on two grounds. First, there was no

public disclosure of private information by Dr. Barbuto. Secondly, Dr. Barbuto's
statements in the context of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged.
Sorensens argued to the trial court that the alleged disclosure by Dr. Barbuto
"meets the definition of a public disclosure55 because Dr. Barbuto5s testimony "was
"anticipated55 to occur in a public forum.55 This argument has several flaws. First,
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anticipated disclosure is not actual disclosure. The controlling fact is that Dr.
Barbuto was excluded from testifying at trial. Sorensens seek a remedy for what
might have occurred, not what did occur. Secondly, disclosure at trial was not
"substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.35 Shattuck-Owen v.
Snowbird Corp.. 2000 UT 94, If 12, 16 P.3d 555, 558-59. Thirdly, Sorensens failto recognize that "communicating a fact to a small group of persons . . . does not
constitute public disclosure," Id. (emphasis added). The complaint states no facts
which would indicate that any information provided by Dr. Barbuto extended
beyond a small group of persons (those involved in the litigation).
The final flaw in plaintiffs argument is that Dr. Barbuto was not the source of
disclosure of Nicholas's confidential medical records. Nicholas himself did that as a
necessary prerequisite to pursuing his personal injury lawsuit. Dr. Barbuto's
involvement with the defense was not a disclosure of confidential records, but simply
an expert evaluation of all Nicholas's medical records, only a part of which arose
from Dr. Barbuto's treatment of him.
Even if there had been a disclosure which placed Nicholas in a false light, the
disclosure would be privileged under Utah law. Placing a party into a "false light55 is
protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. See DeBry v. Godbe. 1999 UT 111, H
10, 992 P.2d 979 (discussing judicial privilege with respect to false and defamatory
statements); Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Utah 1997) (extending
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privilege to claims of invasion of privacy and emotional distress). The judicial
privilege has three elements.
To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the statements
must be (1) made during or in the course of a judicial
proceeding; (2) have some reference to the subject matter of the
proceeding; and (3) be made by someone acting in the capacity
of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.
Krouse v. Bower. 2001 UT 28,1f 8, 20 P.3d 895, 898 (punctuation, citations
omitted).
The scope of "during or in the course of a judicial proceeding55 is viewed very
broadly for purposes of applying the privilege.
This first element, whether a statement is "made during or in the
course of a judicial proceeding,55 is interpreted broadly. As a
result, we have indicated that a statement may qualify as made
during or in the course of a judicial proceeding if the
communication is preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding.
Indeed, we have previously declared that the publication of
defamatory matter by an attorney is protected not only when
made in the institution of proceeding or in the conduct of
litigation before a judicial tribunal, but in conferences and in
communications preliminary thereto.
Krouse 11 9 at 898 (punctuation, citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has affirmed dismissal of claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress based upon the judicial proceeding privilege. Bennett v. Tones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonougL 2003 UT 9,1f 67, 70 P.3d 17, 32; DeBryv.
Godbe supra U 25 at 985. This Court held in a memorandum decision, Alderink v.
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Barden, 2004 UT App 330, 2004 WL 2108887 (copy enclosed as addendum B),
affirming the trial court's motion to dismiss, that submission by an expert witness of
an allegedly false affidavit in the context of a divorce proceeding satisfied all of the
elements for privilege.
To attempt to dodge the fundamental flaws in their invasion of privacy claims,
Sorensens argue that Dr. Barbuto's deposition was filed with the court and cc[t]hat is
the epitome of public disclosure." (Aplt's Brf. p. 36.) Sorensens ignore two
problems with this argument. They could have sought a protective order sealing the
deposition and preventing it from becoming public. Moreover, filing of the
deposition confirms the judicial proceeding element of the privilege. Finally, it was
Nicholas's own attorney who insisted on, took and had published the deposition.
The complaint leaves no question that the actions by Dr. Barbuto occurred in
the course of a judicial proceeding. The confidentiality at issue here, Nicholas's
physical condition, was also at issue in his personal injury trial. Also established by
the complaint is that Dr. Barbuto was acting in the capacity of a witness for the
defense. All of the elements of the judicial proceeding privilege are satisfied,
entiding Dr. Barbuto to invoke the privilege against Sorensens' invasion of privacy
claim.
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VII. SORENSENS' CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT COULD GRANT RELIEF.
Sorensens argue that the issue of whether Dr. Barbuto's conduct was "extreme
and outrageous," permitting a claim for infliction of emotional distress, is a jury
question, citing Tackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995). However, both this
Court and the Supreme Court have addressed the issue since Jackson and determined
that it is a legal question for the trial court to determine whether the alleged conduct
was so "extreme and outrageous55 as to support the intentional tort claim. Walter v.
Stewart, 2003 UT App 86,11 26, 67 P.3d 1042, 1048 (citing Schuurman v.
Shingleton. 2001 UT 52,11 23, 26 P.3d 227). Walter and Schuurman. the most
recent pronouncement of the appellate courts on this issue, must be considered the
current governing law.
Even if the conduct of Dr. Barbuto satisfied the extreme and outrageous
requirements to state a claim for relief, the claim is nonetheless barred by the judicial
immunity privilege. Bennett 11 68 at 33 (even if we were to assume that. . . [the]
alleged conduct. . . that is, their statements to the court during the judicial
proceeding and the use of the legal process itself, were sufficiently outrageous,
Bennett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the
judicial proceeding privilege55); DeBry v. Godbe U 25 at 985 (affirming dismissal of
infliction of emotional distress claim as barred by judicial proceeding privilege).
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While the issue of privilege was not argued before the trial court. It is,
however, appropriate for this Court to affirm dismissal on that basis.
Even though the trial court did not rely on this reasoning in
dismissing the cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, we may affirm the trial court's dismissal on
this alternate ground.
Bennett 67 at 32 n. 8.
The trial court properly determined that Dr. Barbuto's conduct was not so
extreme and outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Even if the court were wrong on that decision, however, the claim is barred
by the judicial proceeding privilege.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY F O U N D N O MERIT IN
SORENSENS 5 NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS.
Sorensens misunderstand the issue of negligence as presented to and decided
by the trial court. The threshold in any negligence claim is the existence of a duty.
The court, having found no duty, could not find that Sorensens had stated any claim
for negligence because there was no duty to breach. The real issue is not whether
Sorensens may alternatively plead intentional and negligent action. The issue is
whether they have stated a claim for relief by their negligence allegations. Where
there is no duty, there can be no negligence.
Moreover, regardless of whether the claims are based upon intentional or
negligent actions, the claims of invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional
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distress are barred by the judicial proceeding privilege, as evidenced on the face of
the complaint.
IX.

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD DAMAGES MAY
CONSTITUTE A FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINT TO STATE A
CLAIM.
Sorensens are mostiy correct in stating the law with respect to a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.

CC

[A] court may grant relief only if a valid legal basis supported by

well-pled facts is asserted in the complaint.53 Richardson v. Matador Steak House,
Inc., 948 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1997). However, Sorensens assume that a statement
that a plaintiff has been damaged is a fact rather than a mere conclusory statement.
"Mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of
surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal. Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003
UT App 85, II 2 1 , 69 P.3d 286, 291 (citation omitted).
Faced with the conclusory statement that the plaintiff suffered damages, a trial
court must turn to the complaint to determine if any facts, or inferences from those
facts support a the conclusion that the plaintiff was damaged. Simple distress and
"painful emotions" over circumstances are insufficient to support a claim for
damages. E.g., Schuurman 11 25 at 233 (discussing types of emotional injury which
do not support a claim for emotional distress). It is appropriate for a trial court to
dismiss a complaint for inadequate pleading of damages. Bennett If 81 at 35
(affirming trial court's dismissal of claim for failure to adequately plead damages).
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A review of the complaint in this matter reveals no factual basis for the alleged
damages. As discussed above, there is no statement which would lead to the
conclusion that Mr. Sorensen suffered economic injury to support a breach of
contract claim. The complaint also confirms that Dr. Barbuto's testimony was
excluded from trial, so there can be no injury based upon his opinions. The release
of Dr. Barbuto's medical records for Mr. Sorensen resulted from Sorensens placing
his physical condition at issue, so he could not be damaged by the release of
information. There is simply nothing in the complaint which would provide a
factual basis for the conclusory damage claims. To the contrary, the facts in the
complaint support the opposite conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The sufficiency of a complaint always turns on whether it contains well-pled
facts to support a legally recognized claim for relief. Sorensens5 complaint falls short
of satisfying that standard. The trial court therefore correctly determined that the
complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and correcdy dismissed the
action. It is appropriate for this Court to affirm that dismissal.
DATED this 3~£ day of October, 2005.
WilXIAMS & HUNT ,
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Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee Opinion No. 99-03.
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UT Eth. Op. 99-03, 1999 WL 396999 (Utah St.Bar.)
(Cite as: 1999 WL 396999 (Utah St.Bar.))

Rank 1 of 1

Databas
UTETH-E

Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee
*1 Opinion Number 99-03
Approved May 28, 1999
Issue: May a defense lawyer make ex parte contact with plaintiff's treating
physician?
Opinion: No ethical rule prohibits ex parte contact with plaintiff's treating
physician when plaintiff's physical condition is at issue.
Analysis: It is neither uncommon nor improper, under the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct, for an attorney to make ex parte contacts with witnesses
involved in a controversy, including witnesses for the adversary. Whe>n that
witness is a medical doctor, especially one who has treated the plaintiff in a
litigation, concerns may be raised about the physician's and both lawyers'
ethical responsibilities to maintain confidences and to abide by other
professional responsibilities.
In cases where the witness-physician is not separately represented by another
lawyer in the matter, there is no provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that prohibits a defense attorney from making an ex parte contact with the
plaintiff's treating physician.
Although there may be a potential for ethical misconduct arising out of such a
contact, such misconduct can be separately addressed and remedied in accordance
with the appropriate rules. In an opinion issued in 1993, the American Bar
Association held that no provision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
directly prohibits ex parte contacts with the other side's witnesses in civil
matters. The ABA opinion discusses the ethical rules in light of expert
witnesses as well as fact witnesses:
There are nonetheless some ethical limitations that apply to contacts with any
witness, and some additional limitations that may have different application to
expert witnesses. Among the former, the principal limitations are the
obligations of candor imposed by Rule 4.3 on dealing with unrepresented persons.
When a lawyer contacts any witness, lay or expert, actual or potential, a lawyei
must not knowingly leave the witness in ignorance of the lawyer's relationship
to the case that gives occasion to the contact. Further, the lawyer may not,
consistent with Rule 4.1(a), convey the message, directly or indirectly, that
the witness must speak to the lawyer. As with any other witness not under
subpoena, an expert witness may choose not to discuss the case with the lawyer.
In fact, the opposing party or its lawyer may properly have asked the expert not
to discuss the case with the inquiring lawyer. See Model Rule 3.4(f).
The ABA opinion also warns about attempts to induce an opposing witness to
reveal confidences:
[B]oth fact witnesses and experts may be in possession of confidences of the
opposing party, or work product of that party's lawyer, about which it would be
improper to inquire. See American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-at Vegas, 748 F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984), holding that "A corollary of the
attorney's duty not to reveal confidences of a client is the duty not to seek to
2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page
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(Cite as: 1999 WL 396999, *1 (Utah St.Bar.))
cause another to do so." [FN1]
*2 Using an ex parte contact to attempt to obtain information protected by the
physician-patient privilege would violate Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
3.4(c), 4.4, and 8.4(d). Other considerations arise when the physician's role i
to appear as an expert witness; the Committee notes that an expert witness may
be privy to opposing counsel's legal theories and thought processes and there
may be little information from that physician-expert that would not be protecte
by the appropriate confidential privileges.
In addition to the concerns raised in ABA Opinion 93-378, it would also be
improper for the attorney to attempt to persuade the witness not to testify;
[FN2] to disobey or to circumvent the appropriate court rules concerning
discovery and evidence; [FN3] to ask a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party; [FN4] or use the
ex parte contact in a way that may tend to embarrass, delay or burden the
doctor. [FN5] Overreaching by counsel in the ways discussed above is prohibited
by the ethics rules, as is similar improper influence on the part of plaintiff's
counsel.
The mere possibility of misconduct by an attorney during an ex parte contact
with a physician does not justify a blanket prohibition on such ex parte
contacts. Thus, it would not be appropriate to assume that an ex parte interview
conducted by either plaintiff or defendant would be outside the bounds of propei
discovery. [FN6] An attorney must conform to the rules of the court and
particular rules of evidence and discovery in each case. The court may limit or
condition ex parte contacts, but as a matter of professional ethics and the
existing rules, there is no bar to such ex parte contacts. Many states have come
to the same opinion that attorneys for a defendant in a personal injury case
have the right to interview plaintiff's treating physician ex parte. [FN7]
The attorneys involved in an ex parte contact of an opposing witness may
appropriately be concerned about the extent of a physician-patient privilege.
The nature and extent of that privilege is carefully defined in statute, rule
and court decision and is, there fore, a matter for legal interpretation. It is
not the function of this Committee to offer legal advice regarding th€> extent of
the privilege; in situations where the question is a close one, the mettter
should be addressed by the parties in concert with the court, applying
applicable rules of discovery and evidence.
FN1 ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378. The opinion
also reminds attorneys that Rule 3.4(b) prohibits attorneys from "counsel [ing]
or assisting[ing] a witness to testify falsely."
FN2 "A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party's access to
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another
person to do any such act." Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(a).
FN3 "A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of
a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists." Id. 3.4(c)
FN4 "A lawyer shall not . . . request a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless: (1) The
person is a relative or other agent of a client; and (2) The lawyer reasonably
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believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected from giving
such information." Id. 3.4(f).
FN5 "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, o
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a
person." Id. 4.4.
FN6 State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. App. 1985).
FN7 See, e.g., Mich. Ethics Op. 60 (Dec. 1980); Mich. Ethics Op. 177 (July
1958); Wash. State Bar Ethics Op. 108 (April 1962); Wash. State Bar Ethics Op.
115 (Dec. 1962). 4
END OF DOCUMENT
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Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2108887 (Utah App.),
(Cite as: 2004 WL 2108887 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Mallory A. ALDERINK, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
R. Christopher BARDEN, Defendant and
Appellee.
No. 20040581-CA.
Sept. 23, 2004.
Fourth District, Provo Department; The Honorable
James R. Taylor.
Ron D. Wilkinson, Orem, for Appellant.
James S. Jardine and Gregory S. Roberts, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Mallory A. Alderink appeals the order of the
trial court granting R. Christopher Barden's motion
to dismiss. This case is before the court on its own
motion for summary disposition on the basis that the
grounds for appeal are so insubstantial as not to
merit further proceedings or consideration by the
appellate court. See Utah R.App. P. 10.
Alderink's Complaint alleges various claims based
upon the filing of an affidavit drafted by an
individual retained as an expert witness in a divorce
proceeding. The Complaint was dismissed by the
trial court, on the basis that the affidavit was
protected by the judicial proceeding privilege.
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"[F]alse and defamatory statements are not
actionable if they are protected by a legal privilege,"
such as the judicial proceeding privilege. Debry v.
Godbe, 1999 UT 111, U 10, 992 P .2d 979. This
privilege extends "not only to defamation claims but
to all claims arising from the same statements."
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough,
2003 UT 9, H 67, 70 P.3d 17 (dismissing claim for
intentional infliction of emotional
distress)
(quotations and citations omitted). To establish the
judicial proceeding privilege, the statements must
be: "(1) made during or in the course of a judicial
proceeding; (2) have some reference to the subject
matter of the proceeding; and (3) be made by
someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror,
witness, litigant or counsel ." Krouse v. Bower,
2001 UT 28, U 8, 20P.3d895.
Alderink's Complaint establishes that each element
of the judicial proceeding privilege is present here.
The Complaint alleges that Barden, a person retained
"to serve as an expert witness" in the divorce case
by Alderink's ex-husband, "drafted, signed and
submitted to the court a lengthy document which
[Barden] purported to be an affidavit which outlined
his psychological evaluation and diagnosis of Ms.
Alderink." Thus, the first and third elements of the
privilege are satisfied. See id. Alderink's Complaint
also establishes that the second element is satisfied,
because the affidavit clearly refers to the divorce
proceeding.
Therefore, each element of the three-part test is
satisfied, and the affidavit submitted by Barden is
protected by the judicial proceeding privilege.
Accordingly, the trial court's order granting
Barden's motion to dismiss is affirmed.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2108887 (Utah
App.), 2004 UT App 330
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